“Subsequent practice” of member states of a treaty, as a possible way for making indirect amendments to that treaty, has been accepted by many authors and has been also recognized in judicial and arbitration decisions. This paper focuses on one aspect of this issue: has the prohibition on the use of force and threat, as a treaty and contractual commitment mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations, been ever amended and changed due to subsequent practice of member states of the treaty? To answer this question, existence of such a prohibition will be first studied in “contractual” terms. Then, various aspects of the prohibition and exceptions made to it in the text of the contract as well as possible impacts of subsequent practice of member states of the contract on this prohibition and its exceptions have been evaluated. To do this, the present paper avoids of in-depth discussion of the details of arguments provided by proponents and opponents of various doctrines which prescribe recourse to force. Instead, it reviews certain points about possible amendment and change in Para.4, Article 2 or Article 15 of the Charter of the United Nations as a result of subsequent practice of member states.

The theory of jus cogens entered into the international positive law by virtue of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to its article 53, there are three criteria for identification of a peremptory norm which are (i) being a norm of general international law, (ii) non-derogability, and (iii) recognition and acceptance of non-derogability by the international community of States as a whole. Furthermore, belief in the peremptory status of the ban on use of force is widespread but an evaluation of the prohibition on use of force based on the above-mentioned criteria demonstrates that the prohibition on use of force could not be considered as a peremptory norm since such nature has not been sufficiently recognized by the States. furthermore, it is derogable and apologetic under Security Council’ s authorization to use force and self-defense, respectively. In contrast, the prohibition on aggression is indeed non-derogable and without any exception and also its peremptory nature has been implicitly recognized by the international community of States as a whole. Thus, it appears that the peremptory norm of international law on use of force should be the prohibition on aggression.

Due to the many advantages of cyber attacks as a new method of warfare compared to the conventional and traditional methods of war, the attention of different countries has been drawn to this phenomenon over the recent years. Furthermore, noting the point that the efforts of some countries and international assemblies to systematize the tools, methods and effects of this style of attack and conflict still face a lack of consensus and, as a consequence, have not resulted in creation of an international document, the international lawyers have faced many challenges in dealing with this phenomenon and its destructive effects on the important and vital infrastructure of countries and defending the rights of nations against cyber attacks. There are now many legal rules governing the situations in which states can resort to force as well as the point as how they can resort to force in armed conflicts. Some of these rules do not apply specifically to cyber attacks including the rules related to the protection of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked. Other rules include general principles that apply to cyberattacks. Nevertheless, it seems that the gap between conventional weapons such as biological and chemical weapons and methods of cyber-attack can be very large. This article addresses the Principle of Prohibition of the Use of Force and the Principle of Distinction and examines the challenges of applying the same to the cyber attacks.

US and allies multiple attacks on Syria during 2014-2018 in the excuses of, inter alia, fighting against ISIS and humentrian intervention to prevent claimed use of chemical weapons are in breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. several unacceptable arguments including: “ the unwilling and unable theory” , “ Iraq collective self-defense against ISIS in Syria” , “ the creative and constructive ambiguity of S/RES/2249” and “ implied consent or passive consent theory” have been put forwarded to justify US-led coalition attacks on ISIS in Syria. On the other hand, in an attempt to justify attacks on so called Syrian chemical facilities, it has been explicitly or implicitly resorted to some invalid arguments including: “ strikes on Syria in retaliation for chemical attack” , “ humanitarian intervention for Chemical Weapons Convention implementation” and “ illegal but legitimate theory” . In oreder to answer the question that “ why do the US and allies attacks against Syria during 2014-2018 are illegal? ” , this paper descriptively and analytically consider the deployed arguments supporting the above mentioned attacks and examines this hypothesis: “ the aforementioned attacks are international wrongful acts as they cannot be considered as self-defense or collective security system outlined respectively in Article 51 and Article 42 of the UN Charter. On the other hand, the valid consent of Syria, which may precludes the wrongfulness of these attacks, has not been obtained; so, US and allies attacks against Syria during 2014-2018 are illegal. ”

The claim of Russia’s humanitarian intervention in Ukraine serves as a legal justification for theuse of force. However, there is no evidence supporting allegations of genocide in the Donetskor Luhansk regions. While the majority of states oppose Russia’s invasion, this does not justifyoverlooking the rule of law, particularly the law of neutrality. In Ukraine’s struggle againstRussian aggression, the United States and its allies have provided weapons and military trainingto Ukrainian forces. This unprecedented support violates the prohibition of the use of force andthe law of neutrality. According to the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907, neutral countriescannot supply “war material of any kind” to belligerent powers. Consequently, Russia holdsthe right to take countermeasures against governments violating neutrality. Furthermore, underArticle 52 of the First Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949, Russia may target weaponsin Ukraine’s possession. However, if Russia targets these weapons before they are actively usedby Ukraine, such an attack could violate jus ad bellum, as the transfer of weapons alone cannotbe classified as an armed attack against Russia.

The principle of the prohibition of double punishment is one of the accepted principles of criminal law, according to which every crime should only be punished once. This rule is accepted by Islam and it is imperative to abide. In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, this rule has not been accepted if the original punishment was not religious; however, the Islamic Penal Code, adopted in 1392, only accepts this rule in non-legal sanctions. The result of this approach is that the offender, in addition to the primary punishment, must tolerate the religious punishment that is not compatible with the rational principles and the spirit that governs the Islamic law. In this research, by examining the bases of Guardian Council's views on this issue, the fatawa of contemporary imitation and analysis of relevant researches, the Guardian Council's approach to non-acceptance of this rule has been criticized in the sanctity of Shari'ah and, moreover, Adoption of this rule in all punishments has been based on the principle of non-refoulement to the judiciary. Since the famous jurisprudents believe that if the presence of a judge in a lack of authority is in vain and without authority, the reference to him is permissible and his vote is valid, and since in the criminal matters the presence of the offender in the court of law and his punishment are usually It is beyond his discretion that he should consider the verdict of the judge concerned and avoid double punishment for the offender.

The present research has been done to study the 'prohibition of selfhumiliation' as a general jurisprudential principle as well as to scrutinize its educational significations. Studies show that, despite the signification of the jurisprudential principle in sorting out and applying the rules, there are still some other rules and principles which have not been extracted or become well-known among jurists as a jurisprudential principle. One of them is "the prohibition of humiliating oneself [qa'eda ezlal al-nafs]". This research has been done in a descriptive-analytical way using references and library resources. Findings show that religious premises and concepts are general and inclusive and they have the capacity to be applied wherever necessary. The prohibition of self-humiliation can be considered as a preventive educational principle in both individual and social dimensions. The educational implications, therefore, include the necessity of a trainee's adaptation to human nature, the educational principle of self-avoidance in the face of moral evil, the principle of dignity and freedom, the principle of social dignity, and preservation of national authority.

A double ambiguity has been charged against Rawls’s difference principle (DP). Is it Maximin, Leximin, or something else? Usually, following A. Sen, scholars identify DP with the so-called Leximin. One argues here that one has to distinguish 1° the Leximin, 2° the Maximin (as rule of justice formally analogous to the maximin rule of decision), represented by the figure in L of the perfectly substitutable goods, and 3° the genuine DP. When the augmentation of inequality benefits the worse off, only Pareto-strong improvements are permitted. Leximin would also permit Pareto-weak improvements too (after the first maximum D), where only the richest improves: from (2, 3) to (2, 5), say. This is forbidden by DP. With two classes, unlike Maximin, DP has no curve of indifference and is always decisive, as Leximin is. For undecisive Rules of Justice, which admit indifferent curves, I propose to add a lexically secondary rule, to break ties. That move is able to clarify the links and the differences between on the one hand Maximin alone, with its typical indifference curves in L, and on the other hand, the DP properly understood and the Leximin, which both have no indifferent curves. With two classes of persons (best off/worse off), DP appears more egalitarian than Leximin, because it's secondary rule is MinIn (Minimization of Inequality). But the intuition behind the distinction is that it cannot possible “fair” that only the best off improves in a productive social cooperation.

The principle of non-interference one of the founding principles of the United Nations including the fundamental rights and duties of states is rooted in the principle of the sovereign equality of States. Despite efforts by the universal community after the formation of the United Nations Towards definition of the principle of non-interference and the resignation of the states use of force in international relations, unfortunately once again are witness returns to the practice of some states to former and recognize the principle of intervention. In such circumstances, the legitimate use of force and violated the principle of national sovereignty in international transformations of the great powers universal peace and security will be faced with serious challenges.

Objective: Due to various factors, such as the ease of production of narcotics, this issue has become more prevalent in all human societies, including Islamic Iran. Therefore, the present paper examines the jurisprudence principles of the prohibition of drug use. Results: From the public and certain Quranic verses, one can explicitly and clearly discover the religious prohibition of drug use. For example, the reasons pertaining to the prohibition of ego-murder and ego-murder, the prohibition of removing wisdom, the necessity of avoiding filth and acts of evil, on top of which drug use lies. In addition, certain hadiths also imply the prohibition of this act, and the thinkers' rationale confirms the prohibition of this practice. Conclusion: The provision of the principles of the prohibition of narcotics can help the authorities to do their bests to eradicate this phenomenon with ease because of the availability of the religious law and religious prohibition on the use of narcotic drugs. Preachers and scholars are also given religious motives to avoid this act.